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Where Law and Science (and Religion?) Meet
David L. Faigman*
I. Introduction
In the relatively short span of human history, primarily three great
disciplines have vied for dominance. These are law, science, and religion.
Each, in its own manner, has something to say about both the descriptive
world that is and the prescriptive world of what ought to be. Because these
great professions cover much of the same ground, conflicts are inevitable.
Indeed, from the time of Copernicus to modem debates about evolution,
law, science, and religion have collided. To their great credit, the orga-
nizers of this Symposium included papers that explored the intersections of
all three institutions, with most of the presenters' attention devoted to where
law and science meet. In this Article, I offer some general observations
regarding, in particular, the intersection of law and science but offer some
tentative observations regarding where law and science have their roots-in
religion.
Let me begin, however, with what I believe is the first principle in
regard to the study of the respective intersections of law, science, and
religion, a principle that guides all that follows. Each is a separate
discipline, and each has its own decision rules and reasons for interacting
with the others. The interactions of the three disciplines, of course, produce
four basic territorial intersections, each with its own peculiarities and with
relations potentially flowing in either direction.! Thus, for example, where
law and science meet, law might use science to inform its processes or
substance and, in reverse, science might use legal standards that inform its
processes or substance. Each intersection represents a territorial boundary;
there is no domain, at least in the United States, in which any of these
disciplines truly share territory. To understand any particular intersection,
therefore, one must examine it from one side of the fence or the other. My
interest in the subject comes primarily from standing on the law's side of
the fence, looking over at science and religion with the hope and
* John F. Digardi Distinguished Professor of Law, University of California, Hastings College of
the Law; Professor, School of Medicine (Department of Psychiatry), University of California, San
Francisco. I would like to thank our wonderful hosts, John Robertson, Wendy Wagner, and all of
the talented students of the Texas Law Review.
1. A full study of how law, science, and religion interact, then, should have to explore nine
possible interactions: (1) law's use of science, (2) law's use of religion, (3) science's use of law,
(4) science's use of religion, (5) religion's use of law, (6) religion's use of science, (7) law's use
of science and religion, (8) science's use of law and religion, and (9) religion's use of law and
science.
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expectation that they might help answer some of the questions the law asks.
My concern, then, is how law can best employ science or religion to accom-
plish the needs, values, principles, and demands of the law.
II. Religion Begets Science and Law
One way to understand science and law is to see them as the successors
to religion. Religion, of course, has hardly disappeared from the scene. But
where there was once only religion to define the empirical world, craft the
legal order, and determine the fate of people's souls, science and law have
joined these efforts. Science today is primarily associated with the
defining-the-world part of the effort and law the legal-or normative-
order. Religion continues to hold sway over souls. Indeed, it might be
thought that the three great professions of law, science, and religion have
largely divided the domains of the legal, empirical, and spiritual between
them. This would be a mistake, however. Although the legal, factual, and
empirical domains describe these professions' respective fields of focus,
they each regularly trespass on the territory of the other two.
In an earlier work, Legal Alchemy, I explored one of the key transition
points between religion and science. But, as I noted there, "[t]he transition
from ancient sorcery to modern science.., was not as smooth or as
complete as we might like to believe."2 Indeed, Sir Isaac Newton
not only discovered gravity and charted the heavens using calculus,
but he also experimented with alchemy and numerology. Many core
insights of astrology remained integral and respected components of
science until the late seventeenth century. However reputable
science might be today, its roots lie deep in the mystical practices
and superstitions of the past.
What we now consider to be within the province of science,
previous centuries called the philosophy of nature or natural philos-
ophy. Isaac Newton... entitled his masterwork The Mathematical
Principles of Natural Philosophy. Although [he] understood his task
as part of a broader philosophical investigation of why the world
takes the shape humans confront, [Newton] shared the specific goal
of contemporary scientists of describing how the world works. The
move from a focus on the how and the why of nature to solely on the
how is generally associated with the scientific revolution. The
scientific revolution ushered in the modem view that science may
study what can be tested and leave what cannot to priests,
2. DAViD L. FAIGMAN, LEGAL ALCHEMY: THE USE AND MISUSE OF SCIENCE IN THE LAW 7
(1999).
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philosophers, and sorcerers.
3
So long as science and law were part of religion no conflicts would
arise. All of the world's religions historically sought to explain the empiri-
cal world in ways that are consistent with their respective spiritual order
and to construct legal norms that facilitate that order.4 As science and law
separated from religion, however, conflict became inevitable. Between
religion and science, of course, some of the great dramas of the history of
science took place, including such notable figures as Copernicus and
Galileo.5 But even in our own time, religion and science sometimes strain
over the proper way to describe the empirical world. However, at least in
the Western World religion has largely abdicated any substantial role over
many core subject areas of science such as the origins of the universe or the
etiology of diseases. Increasingly, the battles over the empirical world have
not so much involved how the world works-the domain of science-but
what should be done about it-the domain of the law.
Most modem debates that involve religion and science, from
contraception to cloning, end up as issues that must be resolved by the law.6
Very often these issues present a complex mixture of norms and empiricism
that must be reconciled. Consider cloning, for example. Although this
Article is not the place for exploring religious objections to cloning, it is
probably fair to say that many religions-particularly the mainstream
Christian denominations-would object to using this technology to create
human life.7 Moreover, outside of religious doctrine many basic ethical
3. Id. (citing MICHAEL WHITE, ISAAC NEWTON: THE LAST SORCERER (1997)). See also
JAMES GLEICK, ISAAC NEWTON 110-11 (2003) (describing Newton's searches for truth in
theology, alchemy, and mathematics, which he believed to be the language of God).
4. Id. at 8 (explaining that "[flor most of human history law and science were largely unified
within the corpus of religion" and that religion "supplied both a description of the natural world
and the punishment for failing to conform to the rules mandated by that world").
5. See generall.v RICHARD G. OLSON, SCIENCE & RELIGION, 1450-1900: FROM COPERNICUS
TO DARWIN 7-18 (2006) (describing how Galileo and Copernicus's views conflicted with those of
the Catholic Church, exemplifying the tensions between religion and science).
6. See. e.g., Frank Pasquale, Two Concepts of Immorality: Reframing Public Debate on Stem-
Cell Research, 14 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 73, 76-78 (2002) (commenting on the role of scientific
and religious perspectives in shaping policy on stem-cell research and cloning); Elizabeth Spahn
& Barbara Andrade, Mis-Conceptions: The Moment of Conception in Religion, Science, and Law,
32 U.S.F. L. REV. 261, 261-62 (1998) (describing how the "scientific and religious bases" for
understandings of conception affect American laws on reproductive rights).
7. See, e.g., John H. Evans, Religion and Human Cloning: An Exploratory Analysis of the
First Available Opinion Data, 41 J. FOR SCI. STUDY RELIGION 747, 748-50 (2002) (finding
Roman Catholicism to possess the most "clear-cut" stance against cloning, but noting that the
majority of mainline Protestant denominations have official stances against cloning as well).
Perspectives of other religions and their adherents are less clear; Jewish, Hindu, and Muslim
scholars have varied viewpoints that might turn on the precise scientific issue in question. See
generally Elliot N. Dorff, Human Cloning: A Jewish Perspective, 8 S. CAL. INTERDISC. L.J. 117
(1998) (detailing a range of issues that might affect the Jewish perspective on cloning); Dena S.
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principles might raise concerns in this area. From a scientific perspective,
although cloning is well within the scientist's toolkit many empirical issues
remain outstanding regarding its efficacy and health consequences. The
law, whether as a policy matter or a constitutional concern, must integrate
legitimate value-based objections with a well-founded understanding of the
technology's empirical basis and its likely consequences for the organisms
involved.
Alexis de Tocqueville famously observed that "[s]carcely any
political question arises in the United States that is not resolved, sooner or
later, into a judicial question.",8 The same might be said about questions of
science and perhaps less so of religion. Unlike political questions,
however, which are often resolved with finality after they are resolved into
judicial questions, questions of science and religion rarely achieve such
finality. Religion and science, as largely separate institutions from that of
law, typically pursue their aims and fulfill their agendas notwithstanding the
law-unless, of course, specifically directed to act or refrain from acting
pursuant to law. Thus religious objections to cloning and basic research
that might lead to advancements in cloning continue despite any legal
pronouncements on the subject. Over time each of these institutions will
seek to make their respective cases in the marketplace of public opinion.
No better illustration of this struggle exists than that of abortion, which has
involved contentious issues arising out of both religion and science. As I
have observed on this subject previously: "Whereas, in the past, religion
dominated the field, the division of law, science, and religion into separate
institutions has led to a competition among the three for the hearts, minds
and souls of society." 9
Law, science, and religion thus have a rich past and a complicated and
entangled present. Each is involved, to greater and lesser extents, in de-
scribing both a descriptive narrative of what is and a normative prescription
of what ought to be. Religions tend to be more prescriptive than descriptive
and the sciences just the opposite. Law is an amalgamation of both
description and prescription. But each of these great disciplines pursues its
course for reasons and purposes entirely its own. It would be no more ap-
propriate to measure a religion's success by its conformity with the findings
of cosmology than to measure cosmology's success by its conformity to the
Old Testament. Neither religion nor science should expect to dictate the
other's worldview. Similarly, the law operates independently of science
and religion though it is an active borrower of insights and findings from
Davis, Religious Attitudes Toward Cloning: A Tale of Two Creatures, 27 HOFSTRA L. REV. 509,
517 (1999) (commenting on the nuances of Hindu and Buddhist beliefs about cloning).
8. 1 ALEXIS DE TOCQUEVILLE, DEMOCRACY IN AMERICA 280 (Phillips Bradley ed., Henry
Reeve et al. trans., Alfred A. Knopf, Inc. 1945) (1838).
9. FAIGMAN, supra note 2, at 9.
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both. As a borrower, it must be highly sophisticated regarding what it is
getting, although it is incorporating that knowledge for its own purposes.
Space does not permit a full exploration of the intersections of law,
science, and religion. But such a comprehensive study would be well worth
pursuing. In the following sections, I consider just one intersection-where
law and science meet-and there only from the law's side of the fence. But
even from that vantage point, the challenges are great. If the law is to use
science, truly the best engine for discovering "truth,"10 it must understand
what it is getting.
III. Science in the Employ of the Law
The law defines the normative frameworks within which science
becomes relevant for purposes of legal and policy decisions. This is true in
every facet of law and ranging in every direction possible, including
ordinary civil and criminal adjudications, constitutional cases, and matters
within the realm of legislatures and administrative agencies. Ordinary civil
and criminal cases, of course, are fact-driven enterprises. State and federal
statutes, together with the common law, create webs of precepts that stretch
across factual disputes ranging from whether the traffic light was yellow, as
the defendant claims it was, to whether the available toxicological and
epidemiological research is sufficient to permit a jury to conclude that the
plaintiffs leukemia was caused by benzene exposure.11 Constitutional law
is replete with empirical assertions, many of which appear in the most
significant decisions in the nation's history. In Roe v. Wade12 for instance,
the Supreme Court interpreted the Constitution to give viability
10. My apologies to John Henry Wigmore, who wrote that cross-examination was the
"greatest legal engine ever invented for the discovery of truth." 5 JOHN HENRY WIGMORE,
EVIDENCE IN TRIALS AT COMMON LAW § 1367 (James H. Chaboum ed., rev. vol. 1974). Science
is a better engine yet.
11. For an interesting case study on this question, see Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products
Group, Inc., 664 F. Supp. 2d 137, 149 (D. Mass. 2009), which excluded expert testimony on the
basis of failure to demonstrate general causation; Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products Group,
Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 20 (lst Cir. 2011), in which the First Circuit reversed on the basis that the
district court abused its discretion and failed to use an appropriate "weight of the evidence"
analysis to assess general causation; and Milward v. Acuity Specialty Products Group, Inc., 969 F.
Supp. 2d 101, 116 (D. Mass. 2013), which then excluded the expert testimony on the basis of
failure to demonstrate specific causation and granting summary judgment for the defendant. See
also DAVID H. KAYE, DAVID E. BERNSTEIN & JENNIFER L. MNOOKIN, THE NEW WIGMORE: A
TREATISE ON EVIDENCE, EXPERT EVIDENCE § 10.5.1 (2d ed. Supp. 2015) ("In any event, the
court's comments on 'weight of the evidence' as a scientific 'methodology' must not be read to
permit the phrase to become a blank check for admission. After all, plaintiffs' experts in General
Electric Co. v. Joiner and Kumho Tire Co. v. Carmichael also were using a weight-of-evidence,
best-inference 'method."' (footnotes omitted)).
12. 410 U.S. 113 (1973).
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constitutional relevance.13 Viability is ostensibly a medical and scientific
fact-however probabilistic-regarding the point in time when a fetus
could survive on its own outside the womb. 14 That it was constitutionally
relevant came from a leap of constitutional imagination. Administrative
agencies, both in their rulemaking and adjudicatory capacities, are steeped
in matters empirical, ranging from neighborhood concerns surrounding
environmental impacts of a coal-burning plant to global concerns
surrounding all coal-burning plants in the nation.1 5 And since many of the
legal webs that surround us begin in state legislatures and Congress,
lawmakers are, or ought to be, deeply interested in empirical issues.
The process of defining legally relevant facts and eventually finding
them is a rather more complicated matter than most lawyers, and possibly
even many judges, likely appreciate. When these facts are or might be the
subject of scientific study, important issues arise regarding how they are to
be translated from science for legal use. This Part considers a host of issues
that arise in the process of using scientific research to answer empirical
questions raised by the law.
A. Defining the Relevance of Empirical Findings
One of the principal aspects of law definition, constitutional or
otherwise, is to establish the facts that are relevant under applicable
doctrine. Do death-qualified juries produce conviction-prone juries in
capital cases? 16 Does a doubling of the risk meet the civil litigation prepon-
derance standard? 17  Do violent video games cause children to be more
13. Id. at 163. This is a theme nicely developed in John A. Robertson, Science Disputes in
Abortion Law, 93 TEXAS L. REV. 1847, 1869-70 (2015).
14. Roe, 410 U.S. at 163.
15. See, e.g., Holly Doremus & W. Michael Hanemann, Of Babies and Bathwater: Why the
Clean Air Act's Cooperative Federalism Framework is Useful for Addressing Global Warming,
50 ARIz. L. REV. 799, 802-03 (2008) (discussing empirical standards and data used by the EPA in
connection with the Clean Air Act).
16. See Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 165 (1986); Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510,
512 (1968).
17. For an example of a court requiring a doubling of the risk to meet the preponderance
standard, see Cano v. Everest Minerals Corp., 362 F. Supp. 2d 814, 820 (W.D. Tex. 2005), where
the court noted:
The Texas Supreme Court has concluded that 'properly designed and executed
epidemiological studies may be part of the evidence supporting causation in a toxic
tort case and that there is a rational basis for relating the requirement that there be
more than a "doubling of the risk" to... the more likely than not burden of proof.'
Courts adopting such a requirement have found that the requirement of a more than
50% probability means that epidemiological evidence must show that the incidence
of an injury or condition in the exposed population was more than double the
incidence in the unexposed or control population.
Id. (quoting Merrell Dow Pharm., Inc. v. Havner, 953 S.W.2d 706, 717 (Tex. 1997)).
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violent?' 8 Is free expression chilled in the absence of "breathing space" for
false speech?' 9 Does unlimited corporate political spending create a per-
ception of corruption?20  Does benzene cause leukemia? 21 Did benzene
cause the plaintiffs leukemia? 22 When does death occur, or what is the
likelihood that someone in a persistent vegetative state might regain normal
functions? 23  These are principally empirical questions, the answers to
which potentially impact both law definition and law application.
Whether a particular fact has legal relevance is a product of
interpreting some text. In many areas this is a fairly straightforward affair,
as might be the case regarding the permitted amount of perchlorate in a
city's water supply. To be sure, there may be many ancillary issues
surrounding the process of measurement or the possible source of the
perchlorate, but these follow naturally from the initial question presented.
In other contexts, however, whether a particular fact is relevant to the deci-
sion at all might be a matter of significant disagreement. This is especially
so in constitutional cases.
In Witherspoon v. Illinois24 for instance, the Court considered the
constitutionality of an Illinois statute that provided that "[i]n trials for
murder it shall be a cause for challenge of any juror who ... has
conscientious scruples against capital punishment, or that he is opposed to
the same.,, 25 The petitioner argued that social-science research indicated
that excluding jurors who oppose capital punishment (called "Witherspoon-
excludable" jurors) 26 would result in a conviction-prone jury.2 7  The
Witherspoon Court agreed that this was a constitutionally relevant fact but
found that the research was not yet conclusive on the issue:
The data ... are too tentative and fragmentary to establish that jurors
not opposed to the death penalty tend to favor the prosecution in the
determination of guilt. We simply cannot conclude, either on the
18. See Brown v. Entm't Merchs. Ass'n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2738-39 (2011) (considering
whether preventing violent tendencies in children caused by violent video games is a sufficiently
compelling government interest to limit First Amendment rights).
19. See N.Y. Times Co. v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254, 271-73 (1964) (quoting NAACP v. Button,
371 U.S. 415, 433 (1963)) (internal quotation marks omitted) (discussing the circumstances under
which expression is likely to be chilled).
20. Citizens United v. Fed. Election Comm'n, 130 S. Ct. 876, 909 (2010).
21. Milward v. Acuity Specialty Prods. Grp., Inc., 639 F.3d 11, 13 (1st Cir. 2011).
22. Id.
23. See generally Robert D. Truog, Defining Death: Getting it Wrong for All the Right
Reasons, 93 TEXAS L. REV. 1881 (2015) (identifying and resolving conflicts between the Uniform
Determination of Death Act and organ-donation practices).
24. 391 U.S. 510 (1968).
25. Id. at 512 (internal quotation marks omitted).
26. Lockhart v. McCree, 476 U.S. 162, 167 (1986).
27. Witherspoon, 391 U.S. at 516-17.
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basis of the record now before us or as a matter of judicial notice,
that the exclusion of jurors opposed to capital punishment results in
an unrepresentative jury on the issue of guilt or substantially
increases the risk of conviction.
28
The Witherspoon Court highlighted the need for data on this issue and
specifically noted that "a defendant convicted by such a jury in some future
case might still attempt to establish that the jury was less than neutral with
respect to guilt. '29 As the Court put it: "[w]hatever else might be said of
capital punishment, it is at least clear that its imposition by a hanging jury
cannot be squared with the Constitution."30 Not surprisingly, the Court's
call for research inspired a spate of studies on the subject of death
qualification.31 The issue returned to the Court in Lockhart v. McCree. 2
In Lockhart, the Court rejected on two grounds McCree's argument
that the research supported his claim that excluding death-qualified jurors
constituted a constitutional violation.33 First of all, Justice Rehnquist (later
Chief Justice) found the studies to be methodologically flawed and only
marginally relevant to the question of McCree's own conviction.34 Second,
Rehnquist stated that even if the research studies were valid, they still did
not make out a constitutional violation. 35 The Court held that the empirical
issue examined by researchers was not constitutionally relevant.
36
Rehnquist explained that the issue was not whether death-qualified juries as
a class might result in higher conviction rates, as seemed to be the holding
in Witherspoon.37  Instead, the pertinent constitutional question was
whether a particular jury consists of "jurors who will conscientiously apply
the law and find the facts. 38  This, of course, is a profoundly different
empirical issue.
28. Id. at 517-18 (citations omitted).
29. Id. at 520 n. 18 (emphasis omitted).
30. Id. at 523.
31. Michael Finch & Mark Ferraro, The Empirical Challenge to Death-Qualified Juries: On
Further Examination, 65 NEB. L. REV. 21, 24 (1986) ("In the seventeen years following
Witherspoon, death qualification has been one of the most studied subjects in the area of
sociological jurisprudence.").
32. 476 U.S. 162 (1986).
33. Id. at 184.
34. Id. at 168-69.
35. Id. at 173 ("[W]e will assume for purposes of this opinion that the studies are both
methodologically valid and adequate to establish that 'death qualification' in fact produces juries
somewhat more 'conviction-prone' than 'non-death-qualified' juries.").
36. 1d. at 183-84.
37. Id. at 177-78.
38. Id. at 178 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Wainwright v. Witt, 469 U.S. 412, 423 (1985))
(internal quotation marks omitted).
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B. Defining the Applicable Frame of Reference
The issue of defining the legal relevance of scientific facts is rather
more complicated yet. It is not simply a question of whether some fact is
relevant but how that fact is to be framed. In other words, what is the
proper empirical frame of reference for decision making? This is a
profound issue in constitutional cases. Indeed, one way to understand the
move from Witherspoon to Lockhart was that the Court essentially
reframed the question from a general statistical issue to a case-specific fact
determination. In Witherspoon, the Court asked whether "the exclusion of
jurors opposed to capital punishment results in an unrepresentative jury...
or substantially increases the risk of conviction. 39  This is a fact that
scientific research might help answer. In Lockhart, the issue was reframed
to whether "the jurors [in the particular case] can conscientiously and
properly carry out their sworn duty to apply the law to the facts. 4 0 Science
was no longer relevant to the pertinent inquiry. This issue of framing is
endemic to constitutional fact-finding.
In Planned Parenthood of Southeastern Pennsylvania v. Casey,4 1 for
example, the Court decided that the twenty-four-hour waiting provision did
not create a substantial obstacle to the abortion right and was therefore
constitutional.42 Yet the Court decided this question on the "record before
[it]" in 1992.43 If future research challenges this conclusion, what is the
proper frame of reference for deciding the constitutional question presented
of whether the twenty-four-hour wait is a substantial obstacle? 44  Is it
national-as was the case with the Court's invalidation of the spousal-
notification provision?45 Or should it be statewide, or possibly local, or
even on a case-by-case basis? After all, a twenty-four-hour waiting
provision is likely to be a different sort of burden in Delaware than it might
46be in Wyoming.
This question of the proper frame of reference has been posed in many
of the most important decisions in the Court's history, including possibly
the best known, Brown v. Board of Education.47 In Brown, the Court
famously held that school segregation was unconstitutional in all cases,
39. Witherspoon v. Illinois, 391 U.S. 510, 518 (1968).
40. Lockhart, 476 U.S. at 184.
41. 505 U.S. 833 (1992).
42. Id. at 886-87. See also Robertson, supra note 13, at 1856-57.
43. Casey, 505 U.S. at 887.
44. See, e.g., A Woman's Choice-E. Side Women's Clinic v. Newman, 305 F.3d 684, 687
(7th Cir. 2002).
45. Casey, 505 U.S. at 894-95.
46. DAvID L. FAIGMAN, CONSTITUTIONAL FICTIONS: A UNIFIED THEORY OF
CONSTITUTIONAL FACTS 60 n.202 (2008).
47. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
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finding that segregation of white and black children in public schools "has a
detrimental effect upon" the black children.48 And, moreover, the Court
observed: "[w]hatever may have been the extent of psychological
knowledge at the time of Plessy v. Ferguson, this finding is amply
supported by modem authority., 49  The Court cited the famous-or
infamous-Kenneth Clark doll studies to support this holding.50
But the Court did not require, as it well could have, litigants in
different jurisdictions to prove that segregation has detrimental effects in
those particular locales, much less on particular individuals. Indeed, at oral
argument Justice Hugo Black inquired about this very issue. 51 During the
argument, the NAACP's Robert Carter asked the Court to abide by the
Topeka case's finding of fact that segregation had deleterious psychological
consequences.52 He told the Court that the district judge's fact-finding
makes a reversal "necessary. 53 Carter argued, "[I]f there [are inequalities],
in fact,. . . educational opportunities can not be equal in law.",54 Justice
Black asked him whether that was "a general finding or ... state[d] ... for
the State of Kansas, City of Topeka?, 55 Carter responded: "I think that the
findings were made in this specific case referring to this specific case."56
Justice Black seemed troubled by the ramifications of limiting the empirical
lesson to the single case of Topeka. Justice Black asked, "then you would
have different rulings with respect to the places to which this applies, is that
true? '57 Carter realized his mistake but backpedaled too far, stating: "Now,
of course, under our theory, you do not have to reach the finding of fact or a
fact at all in reaching the decision because of the fact that we maintain that
this is an unconstitutional classification being based upon race and,
therefore, it is arbitrary. 58 Of course, if simply segregating on the basis of
race had been sufficiently arbitrary to render segregation unconstitutional,
none of the social science would have been needed in the first place.
Many other cases have presented similar challenges regarding the
proper frame of reference for the legally relevant empirical claim. In
McCleskey v. Kemp,59 for example, McCleskey argued that defendants in
48. Brown, 347 U.S. at 494 (internal quotation marks omitted).
49. Id.
50. Id. at494n.1.
51. REMOVING A BADGE OF SLAVERY: THE RECORD OF BROWN V. BOARD OF EDUCATION
131-32 (Mark Whitman ed., 1993).
52. Id.
53. Id. at 131.
54. Id. (second alteration in original).
55. Id.
56. Id.
57. Id. at 131-32.
58. Id. at 132.
59. 481 U.S. 279 (1987).
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Georgia were 4.3 times more likely to get the death penalty if they had
killed a white person than if they had killed a black person.60 He challenged
the Georgia capital-sentencing scheme on the basis of both the Eighth and
Fourteenth Amendments. 6' Under the Eighth Amendment it had previously
been the rule that system-wide discrimination constituted "cruel and
unusual punishment., 62 In Godfrey v. Georgia,63 for example, the Court
held that the death penalty could "not be imposed under sentencing
procedures that create a substantial risk that the punishment will be inflicted
in an arbitrary and capricious manner. '' 64 Under such a rule, the defendant
would not have to prove that race affected his sentencing decision. The
Eighth Amendment's concern is the "sentencing system as a whole.,
65
The McCleskey Court, however, rejected the system-wide perspective
of the case law and held that the proper constitutional fact question was
case specific.66 The Eighth Amendment, according to the Court, requires a
challenger to demonstrate that his prosecutor, jury, or judge discriminated
against him on the basis of race. 67 This rendered the statistical demonstra-
tion irrelevant. As the Court stated, "even Professor Baldus does not
contend that his statistics prove ... that race was a factor in McCleskey's
particular case., 68 McCleskey would have to prove that discrimination had
occurred in his case. Needless to say, perhaps, but the evidentiary burden
of demonstrating that any particular prosecutor, jury, or judge discriminated
is a nearly insurmountable task.
The Court effectively did the same thing in Gonzales v. Carhart,
69
when it held that a facial challenge failed and that empirical evidence on the
general constitutional fact regarding whether a health exception was
necessary to a ban on so-called partial-birth abortions did not demonstrate a
substantial obstacle. 70 However, the Court stated that an individual woman
might demonstrate such a burden in an as-applied challenge.7' Once again,
60. Id. at 321 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
61. Id. at286.
62. Id. at 320, 322-24 (Brennan, J., dissenting).
63. 446 U.S. 420 (1980).
64. Id. at 427 (restating the Court's holding in Furman v. Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 239-40
(1972) (per curiam)).
65. Gregg v. Georgia, 428 U.S. 153, 200 (1976).
66. See McCleskey, 481 U.S. at 308 (finding lawful Georgia's focus "on the particularized
nature of the crime and the particularized characteristics of the individual defendant." (quoting
Gregg, 428 U.S. at 206) (internal quotation marks omitted)).
67. Id. at 308-10.
68. Id. at 308.
69. 550 U.S. 124 (2007).
70. Id. at 164-65.
71. Id. at 167 ("[T]he proper means to consider exceptions is by as-applied challenge....
This is the proper manner to protect the health of the woman if it can be shown that in discrete and
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reframing the empirically relevant issue from the general to the specific
effectively vacated an entire species of claim.
72
C. Operationally Defining Relevant Facts
A closely related issue to the law's need to define the relevant fact and
to establish the requisite level of analysis is that the law must also decide
how to operationalize the legal construct in question. Concepts such as
"competency," "intelligence," "volitional control," and "death" are not self-
defining. Professor Tom McGarity provides a straightforward example in
his article regarding the choice between "fixed air-quality monitors" versus
"personal monitors" for the purpose of measuring air quality.73 Which
measure is adequate, sufficient, or both for policy decisions under the law is
a matter of legal judgment. They are both reasonable scientific measures,
but the law has to decide which one (or both) might be used under
applicable doctrine.
A similar sort of issue is presented regarding the proper definition of
"intellectual disability" for purposes of exempting certain defendants from
capital punishment under the Eighth Amendment. In 2002 in Atkins v.
Virginia,74 the Court held that the execution of an intellectually disabled
individual convicted of a capital offense constituted cruel and unusual
punishment and was prohibited by the Eighth Amendment.75  The Atkins
Court, however, held that the issue of defining intellectual disability was
reserved for the states.76 But the states adopted widely varying threshold
standards for intellectual disability.77  This variability is inherently
problematic, since the constitutional fact involved here (i.e., intellectual
well-defined instances a particular condition has or is likely to occur in which the procedure
prohibited by the Act must be used.").
72. See B. Jessie Hill, A Radically Immodest Judicial Modesty: The End of Facial Challenges
to Abortion Regulations and the Future of the Health Exception in the Roberts Era, 59 CASE W.
RES. L. REV. 997, 1013 (2009) ("[I]t is hard to imagine any individual woman who would have
standing to bring such a challenge, much less the desire to do so. In order to have standing, the
woman would presumably have to argue that she was going to become pregnant and face a health-
threatening (but not life-threatening) condition that required use of the D&X procedure in
particular.").
73. Thomas 0. McGarity, Science and Policy in Setting National Ambient Air Quality
Standards: Resolving the Ozone Enigma, 93 TEXAS L. REV. 1781, 1797 (2015).
74. 536 U.S. 304 (2002).
75. Id. at 321.
76. Id. at 317.
77. See John H. Blume et al., An Empirical Look at Atkins v. Virginia and Its Application in
Capital Cases, 76 TENN. L. REV. 625, 639 (2009) ("Atkins... has not been applied uniformly
among the states.").
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disability) establishes a constitutional guarantee.78 Variability across
jurisdictions regarding what threshold qualifies for constitutional protection
invariably means that defendants' constitutional rights will vary as well.
In Hall v. Florida,7 9 the Court returned to the subject in regard to
Florida's standard of requiring proof of IQ test scores of 70 or below before
a defendant could present any additional evidence of his intellectual
disability.80 The Hall Court held that this rigid approach to defining
intellectual disability was contrary to the basic principles of the Eighth
Amendment. 81
The Court, with Justice Kennedy writing for the majority, began the
analysis with a statement of the basic principles underlying the Eighth
Amendment in this context. The Court explained that "[n]o legitimate
penological purpose is served by executing a person with intellectual
disability. 83 According to the Court, "[P]unishment is justified under one
or more of three principal rationales: rehabilitation, deterrence, and
retribution. 84  Rehabilitation does not apply in death penalty cases.
Moreover, the Court held the two remaining principles justifying
punishment do not apply to those who are intellectually disabled.85 "As for
deterrence," the Court observed, "those with intellectual disability are, by
reason of their condition, likely unable to make the calculated judgments
that are the premise for the deterrence rationale. 86  They have a
"diminished ability" to "process information, to learn from experience, to
engage in logical reasoning, or to control impulses ... [which] make[s] it
less likely that they can process the information of the possibility of
execution as a penalty and, as a result, control their conduct based upon that
information., 87 The Court further found that "[r]etributive values are also
ill-served by executing those with intellectual disability., 88  The Court
78. See FAIGMAN, supra note 46, at 93-96 (discussing the difficulty of defining "intellectual
functioning" for constitutional purposes and how whatever definition is adopted inevitably
impacts constitutional guarantees).
79. 134 S. Ct. 1986 (2014).
80. Id. at 1994.
81. Id. at 2001.
82. Id. at 1992-93.
83. Id. at 1992.
84. Id. (quoting Kennedy v. Lousiana, 554 U.S. 407, 420 (2008)) (internal quotation marks
omitted).
85. Id. at 1993.
86. Id.





stated that "[t]he diminished capacity of the intellectually disabled lessens
moral culpability and hence the retributive value of the punishment.,
89
The Court, therefore, stated that "[tjhe question this case presents is
how intellectual disability must be defined in order to implement" the
principles underlying the guarantees of the Eighth Amendment. 90  In
answering this question, the Court ultimately adhered closely to the
psychiatric profession's definition and practice regarding this catego-
rization. 91 Specifically, as the Court noted, "the medical community defines
intellectual disability according to three criteria: significantly subaverage
intellectual functioning, deficits in adaptive functioning (the inability to
learn basic skills and adjust behavior to changing circumstances), and onset
of these deficits during the developmental period.,
92
In many areas of the law, however, courts and legislators employ
psychological terms irrespective of medical or psychiatric meaning.
Concepts such as "volitional control," and "insanity," for instance, have no
direct corresponding meaning in science.93 In Hall, in contrast, the Court
tracked psychiatry's categorization of intellectual disability virtually jot for
jot.94 Indeed, the Court seems to have been aware of this departure from
ordinary practice since the majority, perhaps somewhat defensively, pointed
out that although its determination that the Florida statute was
unconstitutional was "informed by the views of medical experts," these
"views do not dictate the Court's decision., 95
Justice Alito, dissenting, strongly criticized the majority's reliance on
96current thinking in medicine. He argued that the "views of professional
associations often change," that these changes require courts to follow
along or "judge the validity of each new change," that different
organizations might disagree, that the Court provided no guidance on how
to choose "which organizations' views should govern," and that a clinical
diagnosis of intellectual disability has an unspecified fit with the principles
89. Id.
90. Id. (emphasis added).
91. Id. at 2001.
92. Id. at 1994 (citing Atkins, 536 U.S. at 308 n.3).
93. See Joshua W. Buckholtz & David L. Faigman, Promises, Promises for Neuroscience and
Law, 24 CURRENT BIOLOGY 861, 864 (2014) ("To a cognitive neuroscientist, legal standards like
'volitional capacity' ... are inherently meaningless. They do not map on to specific mental
processes or discrete brain circuits."); Allen D. Spiegel & Peter B. Suskind, A Paroxysmal
Insanity Plea in an 1865 Murder Trial, 16 J. LEGAL MED. 585, 586 (1995) ("Today, insanity is a
legal concept; mental illness is a medical condition.").
94. Hall, 134 S. Ct. at 2005 (Alito, J., dissenting) ("[T]he Court places heavy reliance on the
views (some only recently announced) of professional organizations, but the Court attempts to
downplay the degree to which its decision is dependent upon the views of these private groups.").
95. Id. at 2000 (majority opinion).
96. Id. at 2005 (Alito, J., dissenting).
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of the Eighth Amendment. 97 Justice Alito was thus arguing that the Court
had failed to explain the fit between definitions of intellectual disability that
are promulgated for therapeutic or placement purposes and "the decision
whether the imposition of a death sentence in a particular case would serve
a valid penological end." 98
By failing to relate the legal justification for capital punishment-
deterrence and retribution-to the excusing nature of intellectual disability,
the Hall Court essentially left this area of law entirely unmoored. This is a
recipe for confusion and will most likely lead to divergent opinions in the
courts below.99 The DSM-V, from which the Court borrowed the criteria
for intellectual disability, was compiled for the purposes of treatment and
placement. °00 There was no consideration of how, if at all, the twin criteria
of IQ score and adaptive functioning relate to deterrability or blamewor-
thiness. Indeed, this question of fit is essentially a mixed question of fact
and law. It should require the Court to operationally define the empirical
concept in light of the purposes of the law.
D. Translating Science into the Law
A closely related challenge to the operationalization issue is the
problem inherent in the Hall case and possibly most cases involving
scientific evidence, that of translating between the two professions-not
just culturally, but in terms of concepts and word choices. To take but the
simplest of examples, in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc."'1
the Court stated that the operative question is the "evidentiary reliability" of
the proffered evidence, °2 a term the Court defined as "scientific
validity."'0 3 If legal reliability means scientific validity, what hope do we
have for such concepts as volitional control, competency, differential
etiology, or-for that matter-causation?
An even more fundamental disconnect arose out of Daubert, one that
has sown confusion among lower courts regarding the extent of a judge's
97. Id. at 2006.
98. Id.
99. In Mays v. Stephens, 757 F.3d 211, 218-19 (5th Cir. 2014), the court upheld the Texas
practice of buttressing the three criteria of intellectual functioning, adaptive functioning, and age
of onset with an additional seven evidentiary factors outlined in Ex Parte Briseno, 135 S.W.3d 1,
7-8 (Tex. Crim. App. 2004). The court pointed out that "Hall does not address the
constitutionality of considering additional 'non-diagnostic' factors in deciding mental retardation,
nor does it require a wholesale adoption, without deviation, of ... professional standards and
definitions." Mays, 757 F.3d at 218.
100. AM. PSYCHIATRIC ASS'N, DIAGNOSTIC AND STATISTICAL MANUAL OF MENTAL
DISORDERS 19 (5th ed. 2013).
101. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
102. Id. at 590.
103. Id. at 590 n.9.
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gatekeeping responsibilities under Federal Rule of Evidence 702.104 This
confusion involves the classic division of responsibilities between the
judge's job to determine admissibility and the jury's job to assess the
weight of admitted evidence. In Daubert, the Court sought to draw this line
by distinguishing between the underlying methods and principles of
scientific inquiry and the application of those methods to the case at
hand. 0 5  Ever since, this has been referred to as the methodology-
conclusion distinction. 0 6 This dividing line, however, has turned out to
neither have a principled basis in science nor be readily identifiable in law.
Just four years after Daubert, the Court abandoned the distinction in
General Electric Co. v. Joiner.'0 7 Despite Joiner's unambiguous dismissal
of the proposition that methodology and conclusions are "distinct from one
another," courts continue to use this shorthand to set the boundary between
a judge's responsibility to determine admissibility and the jury's job to
assess weight.1
0 8
The methodology-conclusion distinction is not useless because it
occurs nowhere in scientific research; it is useless because it occurs
everywhere in that research. Indeed, the conventional, virtually required
scheme for organizing scientific articles is to divide them into sections
according to background (i.e., introduction), methods, results, and
discussion (i.e., conclusions). 0 9 But this division of sections does not align
in any true respect to courts' conception of methodology and conclusions
with regard to scientific evidence. Whereas in science the methods section
informs the reader of the research design employed, the results and
discussion sections describe the findings obtained using that design. This is
distinct from the law's use of these terms. In the original conception of
methodology-conclusion in Daubert and subsequent cases-so far as there
was one-the distinction appeared to refer to the notion that "methods and
principles" were limited to the research design used in the studies on which
104. FED. R. EvID. 702.
105. Daubert, 509 U.S. at 596-97.
106. See KAYE, BERNSTEIN & MNOOK1N, supra note 11, § 10.5.1(b)(1)(iii) (noting several
cases where the distinction is made between the scientific methodology used and the conclusions
drawn for a particular case).
107. 522 U.S. 136, 146 (1997) ("But conclusions and methodology are not entirely distinct
from one another.... [N]othing in either Daubert or the Federal Rules of Evidence requires a
district court to admit opinion evidence that is connected to existing data only by the ipse dixit of
the expert.").
108. Id. See also City of Pomona v. SQM N. Am. Corp., 750 F.3d 1036, 1048 (9th Cir. 2014)
("[O]nly a faulty methodology or theory ... is a valid basis to exclude expert testimony.").
109. See, e.g., UCLA UNDERGRADUATE Scd. JOURNAL, GUIDE TO SCIENCE WRITING:
RESEARCH MANUSCRIPTS AND REVIEW ARTICLES 1-2 (2010-2011), available at
http://www.ugresearchsci.ucla.edu/writingscience.htm, archived at http://perma.cc/N63S-JMD2
(showing the "basic overview of a scientific manuscript" to include an Abstract, Introduction,
Methods, Results, and Discussion).
1674 [Vol. 93:1659
Where Law and Science (and Religion?) Meet
the expert relied. As regards what propositions qualified as "conclusions,"
two possibilities emerged. "Conclusions" might include first the inferences
an expert could reasonably draw from those studies as well as, second,
whether those inferences could be applied to the case at hand. Joiner,
however, made clear that the first proposition-the inferences permitted by
the research basis-remained a preliminary gatekeeping responsibility;
Joiner suggested, and Rule 702 later confirmed, that the second
proposition-the applicability to the case at hand-also constituted a
gatekeeping obligation. 10 But given the complex nature of scientific
evidence, this legal standard did not point unambiguously to a dividing line
in this form of proof that aligned with the respective functions of judge and
jury.
The central principle that organizes these categories comes from the
insight associated with what could be called "G2i," that is, that scientists
study phenomena at the group level, but the ultimate legal issue is typically
whether an individual case is an instance of some relevant phenomenon.
G2i essentially describes an inferential disconnect that occurs at the
conventional intersection of science in the courtroom and constitutes a
profound challenge to it. In a recent article, I along with Professors John
Monahan and Christopher Slobogin described the G2i challenge as follows:
[A]ll applied science presents G2i issues. Indeed, all expert
evidence, whether based on controlled experimental research or
years of experience, presents G2i issues. Experts testify to such
matters as the conditions likely to lead to false confessions, the
indicia of schizophrenia, factors that contribute to eyewitness
misidentification, the cancer-causing properties of benzene, and
thousands more. These are all general-population-based-
statements about the empirical world. They are the "G" of G2i and
represent the ordinary perspective of most research and most exper-
tise. However, in the courtroom, the operative questions pertain to
the particular case at hand, the "i" of G2i: Did the suspect falsely
confess? Does the defendant have schizophrenia? Was the witness's
eyewitness identification accurate? Did benzene cause the plaintiff's
leukemia? 1
In that article, we sought to explore how admissibility standards
applied differently depending on whether the expert was a "G" expert or an
"i" expert, what the article describes as "framework experts" or "diagnostic
experts," respectively. 1 2 But the Daubert Court's methodology-conclusion
110. FED. R. EvID. 702(d) ("[T]he expert has reliably applied the principles and methods to
the facts of the case."). See also supra note 107.
111. David L. Faigman, John Monahan & Christopher Slobogin, Group to Individual (G2i)
Inference in Scientific Expert Testimony, 81 U. CHI. L. REv. 417, 420 (2014) (footnote omitted).
112. Id. at 424.
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distinction suggests an even more basic preliminary issue than that of G2i
which must be resolved-that is, establishing the line between the judge's
admissibility decision and the jury's duty to assess weight. The insights
associated with G2i might assist in this though not along any simple lines of
giving framework issues to judges and diagnostic issues to juries. As our
article makes plain, too much of diagnosis depends on general scientific
methods to simply permit it to go wholesale to the jury." 3 More needs to
be done.
If a line is to be drawn between judge and jury, however, it ought to
parallel the nature of scientific inference, and G2i should help inform that
determination. The challenge, then, of scientific evidence is to identify a
principled dividing line between the judge's obligation to decide
admissibility and the jury's task to assess weight. Courts should seek to
identify a "cut-line" that inheres in the nature of scientific evidence itself
and that conforms to the respective obligations of judge and jury.
Preliminarily, G2i does suggest a possible cut-line, though the details would
need to be worked out at length. In brief, however, it could be that judges
should be gatekeepers regarding all expert testimonial statements that are
based on empirical propositions that transcend the particular case. In
contrast, expert testimonial statements that are based on disputed empirical
propositions that are specific to the particular case and which are otherwise
admissible should be submitted to the trier of fact to determine their weight.
E. Decision Rules and Burdens of Proof
In having to decide the framework within which scientific evidence is
used, the law must also determine the decision rule to be applied. Such
rules, of course, establish the ultimate balancing of the two basic kinds of
possible error: false positives and false negatives. The law, of course, has
long used burdens of proof to manage the risk of error as is reflected in the
very different burdens of proof used in civil and criminal cases.' 1 4 In civil
cases, there is no systemic preference between false-positive and false-
negative errors, so the preponderance standard operates merely as a tie
breaker." 15 In criminal cases, in contrast, false positives are considered
113. See id. at 440-72 (applying five admissibility criteria to both framework and diagnostic
evidence).
114. See generally DOUGLAS WALTON, BURDEN OF PROOF, PRESUMPTION AND ARGUMEN-
TATION 57-64 (2014) (describing various explanations of the burdens of proof).
115. See Ronald J. Allen, How Presumptions Should Be Allocated: Burdens of Proof
Uncertainty, and Ambiguity in Modern Legal Discourse, 17 HARV. J.L. & PUB. POL'Y 627, 633-
34 (1994) (explaining that civil litigants are treated equally because they are indistinguishable to
the legal system); Neil Orloff & Jery Stedinger, A Framework for Evaluating the Preponderance-
of-the-Evidence Standard, 131 U. PA. L. REV. 1159, 1168 n.23 (1983) (stating that false negatives
and false positives generally have equal weight).
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highly problematic, which supports the high burden of proof of beyond a
reasonable doubt.1 16 As Sir William Blackstone wrote, "it is better that ten
guilty persons escape, than that one innocent suffer."'
' 17
This balancing of error through burdens of proof was clearly on
display in Addington v. Texas. 118  The Addington Court held that the
Constitution requires a "clear and convincing" standard of proof when a
state seeks to involuntarily commit a person to a mental hospital for an
indefinite period.119 In so holding, the Court rejected the more lenient
preponderance standard as well as the stricter standard applied in criminal
cases of proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 20 The Court first explained that
the function of a standard of proof "is to 'instruct the factfinder concerning
the degree of confidence our society thinks he should have in the
correctness of factual conclusions for a particular type of adjudication.""'12
The Court found that commitment hearings, which pose "a significant
deprivation of liberty," require a standard greater than a preponderance of
the evidence, which is typically employed in "monetary dispute[s] between
private parties."1 22 At the same time, however, the Court refused to require
proof beyond a reasonable doubt. 123 The Court offered a variety of reasons
for choosing this lighter burden. First, following an involuntary
commitment, the continuing involvement of professionals, family, and
friends in the person's treatment provides opportunities for errors to be
corrected. 124 Second, making an error that permits a mentally ill person to
live in the general community is not necessarily good for that person: "[i]t
cannot be said ... that it is much better for a mentally ill person to 'go free'
than for a mentally normal person to be committed."'125 Finally, the Court
observed, "[g]iven the lack of certainty and the fallibility of psychiatric
116. See In re Winship, 397 U.S. 358, 363-64 (1970) ("The requirement of proof beyond a
reasonable doubt has this vital role in our criminal procedure.... Where one party has at stake an
interest of transcending value-as a criminal defendant his liberty-this margin of error is reduced
as to him by the process of placing on the other party the burden of ... persuading the factf'mder
at the conclusion of the trial of his guilt beyond a reasonable doubt." (internal quotation marks
omitted)); Ronald J. Allen, On the Significance of Batting Averages and Strikeout Totals: A
Clarification of the "Naked Statistical Evidence" Debate, the Meaning of "Evidence, " and the
Requirement of Proof Beyond Reasonable Doubt, 65 TUL. L. REV. 1093, 1104 (1991) (arguing
that a higher standard is necessary for criminal cases because the utilitarian balance differs and the
depth of moral questioning is increased).
117. 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES *358.
118. 441 U.S. 418 (1979).
119. Id. at433.
120. Id. at 431.
121. Id. at 423 (quoting Winship, 397 U.S. at 370 (Harlan, J., concurring)).
122. Id. at 423, 425.
123. Id. at431.
124. Id. at 428-29.
125. Id. at 429.
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diagnosis, there is a serious question as to whether a state could ever prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that an individual is both mentally ill and likely
to be dangerous."'
' 26
In one area of civil commitment, however, the clear and convincing
evidence standard might be inappropriate given the reasoning of Addington.
That area is the ever-expanding category of sexually violent offenders.1
2 7
There are important differences between sexual offender commitments and
ordinary commitments. Primary among these differences is that in the
ordinary civil-commitment context treatment is a key component of the
incarceration, whereas with sexual predators protection of society appears
paramount. 128 In contrast, in the case of sexual offenders the role and even
availability of treatment is much more ambiguous. While treatment is often
cited as an avowed goal of sexual-offender civil commitments, it is not
constitutionally mandated. 29 Compounding the lack of treatment for sexual
offenders is the fact that many are held under what are essentially prison-
like conditions and the vast majority are never released. 130  The decision
rule in this, as is true in all other legal contexts, ought to reflect the costs of
making an error either of the false-positive or false-negative variety.
IV. Conclusion
The law is a great borrower. It borrows from the findings in science
and the values and insights in religion. It does so, however, exclusively for
126. Id.
127. See generally John Matthew Fabian, To Catch a Predator, and Then Commit Him for
Life: Sexual Offender Risk Assessment-Part Two, CHAMPION, March 2009, at 32 ("Nearly 20
states have laws addressing the civil commitment of sexually violent predators."); Eric S. Janus,
Closing Pandora's Box: Sexual Predators and the Politics of Sexual Violence, 34 SETON HALL L.
REv. 1233, 1233-50 (2004) (discussing the public uproar against crimes of sexual violence and
how it fuels the expansion of sexually violent-predator laws).
128. See Aruanno v. Hayman, 384 F. App'x 144, 152 (3d Cir. 2010) ("[The Act] serves a
regulatory... purpose, because it seeks to protect the public from possible future harm .... ").
129. For example, in Hubbert v. Superior Court, 969 P.2d 584, 601 (Cal. 1999), the court
rejected the "suggestion that the Legislature cannot constitutionally provide for the civil
commitment of dangerous mentally impaired sexual predators unless the statutory scheme
guarantees and provides 'effective' treatment." See generally Eric S. Janus & Wayne A. Logan,
Substantive Due Process and the Involuntary Confinement of Sexually Violent Predators, 35
CONN. L. REV. 319, 342 (2003) (discussing a substantive due process right to treatment);
Jeslyn A. Miller, Sex Offender Civil Commitment: The Treatment Paradox, 98 CALIF. L. REV.
2093, 2103 (2010) ("Although the Supreme Court has never confirmed a constitutional right to
treatment, the right for individuals to participate meaningfully in treatment is implicit in the
involuntary (implicating substantive due process concerns) and purportedly civil (implicating ex
post facto and double jeopardy concerns) nature of the civil commitment system." (footnotes
omitted)).
130. See, e.g., Karsjens v. Jesson, 6 F. Supp. 3d 916, 916 (D. Minn. 2014) (noting that
plaintiffs alleged "that commitment to [the Minnesota Sex Offender Treatment Program]
essentially amount[s] to lifelong confinement, equivalent to [a] lifetime of criminal incarceration
in [a] facility resembling, and run like, [a] medium to high security prison").
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reasons associated with its own objectives which are many and varied and
include ideals of justice, fairness, and accuracy, as well as more mundane
considerations such as efficiency and finality. When interacting with these
disciplines it behooves the law to understand them. In regard to what
science might offer, then, the law ought to be a sophisticated consumer.
In practice, this sophistication would mean that the law would
understand science much as scientists understand their own discipline. This
need not entail a highly developed knowledge of statistics or research
methods, though a basic appreciation of hypothesis testing would help
considerably. It should mean, however, that the law would come to
understand both the power and the limitations of science. Moreover, it
would mean that legal decision makers would understand and at times exert
control over critical translation points between what scientists study and
what the law needs to know.
In the end, science cannot dictate what is just. But science is now and
will forever more be an essential tool to do justice.
• k "k "k
